Extremism’s worst enemy

In a recent New York Times article titled “Violence Leaves Young Iraqis Doubting Clerics,” writers described a growing feeling of disenchantment and frustration among Iraqi youth with religious extremism and those who preach it. While the Times’ numbers are not statistically significant (only 40 Iraqis in accessible areas were interviewed), the article provides a fascinating insight into the effects and results of the Bush administration’s current strategy on “fighting terrorism” — efforts which I once thought were totally counter-productive, but now believe may actually be getting the job done, but for completely different and unintended reasons.

The Times article uses interviews with Iraqi youth, Islamic clerics, and detention facility administrators to paint a picture of a generation of Iraqis growing dissatisfied with the direction Islamic religious structures are taking them. A feeling of resentment and even hate towards extremist clerics is rising, and with good reason.

Many Iraqis are blaming clerics (many of whom were placed in their positions after the fall of Saddam Hussein, despite having no qualifications or religious training) for the danger they now face daily and the restrictive lives they must lead because of strictly applied Islamic laws. The effects of this are now being seen: attendance at public prayers has noticeably fallen since 2005, professors are having trouble recruiting graduate students for religion classes, and respect for the political power of religious leaders seems to be beginning to wane.

What is fascinating to me about this grassroots movement is how impossible it would have been without the invasion of Iraq. I have always believed that invading countries was the antithesis of “fighting terrorism” (I continue to use quotation marks around this term because I hate using buzzwords — especially ones oxymoronic in nature). However, without the destabilization of the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein and the subsequent rise of Islamic extremist groups like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, Iraqis would never have had the opportunity to experience life with religious extremists in power.

If these groups had been suppressed, Iraqis would never have had firsthand experience of what it would be like to have religious figures in political control. Instead, extremist groups would have endured, slowly siphoning off more youth into their organizations and preaching about a better world that they could create. Instead, driven by poverty and the need to express their dissatisfaction, youth quickly flooded the ranks of such organizations (many of which are no more than conglomerates of gangsters), where they learned firsthand of what extremism had in store for them. Naturally, many recoiled after seeing what life in such organizations had done to them.

Even those outside of such organizations have noticed the negative effects of the rise of extremism — as religious leaders took control of political power, personal freedoms were stifled and punishments were severely enforced: those caught smoking had their fingers broken and long hair was cut and fed to the wearer.

Obviously, Islamic extremism has begun to defeat itself in Iraq. Was this the best way to breed a grassroots resistance to religious extremism in Iraq? It’s unlikely. However, the past is behind us, and quite surprisingly and inadvertently, the war in Iraq has provided a laboratory to study the effects of rampant Islamic extremism as well as the Bush administration’s efforts to end it. While invasion certainly is not the way to eliminate terrorism (if such a thing can ever truly be done), the Bush administration may have been fortunate enough to stumble upon the results they desired, if only by accident.