# **Completeness of Propositional Logic**

# Completeness of $F_T$


• **Theorem** (Completeness of  $F_T$ ) If a sentence S is a tautological consequence of a set T of sentences then  $T \vdash_T S$ .

#### Lemma 2

- **Lemma 2.**  $T \cup \{\neg S\} \vdash_{\top} \bot$  if and only if  $T \vdash_{\top} S$
- **Proof.** Assume  $T \cup \{\neg S\} \vdash_T \bot$
- In other words, there is a proof of  $\bot$  from premises ¬S and certain sentences  $P_1,...,P_n$  of T.

### Proof cont'd

Arrange the premises so that:



#### Other direction

- **Proof.** Assume  $T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{S}$
- In other words, there is a proof of S from certain sentences  $P_1,...,P_n$  of T.
- You finish!

## Reformulating Completeness

- Lemma 2 shows that our assumption that  $T \nvdash_T S$  is tantamount to assuming that  $T \cup \{\neg S\} \nvdash \bot$
- **Definition.** A set of sentences is *formally* consistent if and only  $T \nvdash_{\mathsf{T}} \bot$ , that is, if and only if there is no proof of  $\bot$  from T in  $F_{\mathsf{T}}$ .
- Theorem (Reformulation of Completeness) Every formally consistent set of sentences is tt-satisfiable.
- The Completeness Theorem results from applying this to the set  $T \cup \{\neg S\}$ .

#### Outline of Proof

- Completeness for formally complete sets: First
  we will show that the completeness theorem
  holds of any formally consistent set with an
  additional property, known as formal
  completeness.
  - **Definition.** A set *T* is *formally complete* if for any sentence S of the language, either  $T \vdash_T S$  or  $T \vdash_T \neg S$ .
  - This means that the set T is so strong that it settles every question that can be expressed in the language.
  - In other words, for any sentence, either it or its negation is provable from T.

#### Lemma 3

**Lemma 3.** Let *T* be a formally consistent, formally complete set of sentences, and let R and S be any sentences of the language.

- 1.  $T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} (\mathsf{R} \land \mathsf{S}) \text{ iff } T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{R} \text{ and } T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{S}$
- 2.  $T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} (\mathsf{R} \mathsf{v} \mathsf{S}) \mathsf{iff} \ T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{R} \mathsf{or} \ T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{S}$
- 3.  $T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \neg \mathsf{S} \text{ iff } T \vdash_{\mathsf{S}} \mathsf{S}$
- 4.  $T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} (\mathsf{R} \rightarrow \mathsf{S}) \text{ iff } T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{R} \text{ or } T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{S}$
- 5.  $T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} (\mathsf{R} \longleftrightarrow \mathsf{S})$  iff either  $T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{R}$  and  $T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{S}$  or  $T \nvdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{R}$  and  $T \nvdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{S}$

## Proof of Lemma 3 (1)

- Left-to-right: Use ^ Elimination.
- Right-to-left: Proof by scissors:

## Proof of Lemma 3 (2)

- Right-to-left: v-Introduction
- Left-to-right: [...]

## Proof of Lemma 3 (3)

• **Proof.** Left-to-right: By assumption, we can give a proof of  $\neg S$  from T. Suppose we can also give a proof of S. In that case T is not formally consistent, as we can give a proof of  $\bot$ .

Right-to-left: If we cannot give a proof of S from T, then by the definition of formally complete, we can give a proof of ¬S from T.

- Proposition 4. Every formally consistent, formally complete set of sentences is ttsatisfiable.
- Lemma 3 tells us that we can give a proof for any sentence in a language that is formally complete and consistent.
- Proposition 4 tells us that we can find a truth function  $\hat{h}$ , making that set true.

- **Proof**. Let *T* be the formally consistent, formally complete set of sentences.
- Define an assignment h on the atomic sentences of the language as follows.
- If T  $\vdash_T$  A then let h(A) = TRUE; otherwise let h(A) = FALSE.
- The function h is defined on all the sentences of our language, atomic or complex.
- We claim that for all wffs S, h (S) = TRUE if and only if T⊢<sub>T</sub> S.

- The proof of this is a good example of the importance of proofs by induction on wffs.
- The claim is true for all atomic wffs from the way that h is defined, and the fact that h and  $\hat{h}$ agree on atomic wffs.
- We now show that if the claim holds of wffs R and S, then it holds of (R ∧ S), (R ∨ S), ¬R, (R → S) and (R ← S).
- These all follow easily from Lemma 3.

- Consider the case of disjunction.
- We need to verify that  $h(R \vee S) = TRUE$  if and only if  $T \vdash_T (R \vee S)$ .
- To prove the "only if" half, assume that  $\hat{h}$  (R V S) = TRUE.
- Then, by the definition of h, either h(R) = TRUE or  $\hat{h}(S) = TRUE$  or both.
- Then, by the induction hypothesis, either  $T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{R}$  or  $T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} \mathsf{S}$  or both.
- But then by lemma 3,  $T \vdash_{\mathsf{T}} (\mathsf{R} \lor \mathsf{S})$ , which is what we wanted to prove.
- The other direction is proved in a similar manner.