THE COLD WAR

I. A Bipolar World
II. Onset and Declaration
III. Height of the Cold War
IV. Vietnam and Detente
V. End Game
A. International Level

- Bipolar World
- Germany and Japan destroyed
- Britain and France drained
- US and USSR as ‘Superpowers’
  - Atomic Weapons
- Redrawing of Borders
B. Domestic Level

- Germany and Japan in defeat
- USSR as dominant European power
  - Security concerns
- End of American isolationism
  - Anti-communism
- Britain and France
  - Dean Acheson: “Britain has lost an empire but yet to find a role”
- Rebuilding and Adjustment
C. Individuals

‘Big Three’ (Churchill, FDR, Stalin) at Yalta, February 1945

‘Big Three’ (Attlee, Truman, Stalin) at Potsdam, August 1945
II. Onset and Declaration

- Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ (Feb. ‘46)
  - Novikov’s ‘Response’ (Sept. 1946)
- Fate of Poland and East Europe
  - Czech Coup (February 1948)
- Division of Germany
  - Berlin Airlift (June 1948-May 1949)
- Far East
  - Korea division
  - Mao in China (Oct. 1949)
- Atomic Bomb
  - US 1945; USSR 1949
Europe in 1947
The Division of Germany
II. Onset and Declaration

- Truman Doctrine (March 1947)
  - “I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”

- European Recovery Plan (or ‘Marshall Plan’ June 1947)

- George Kennan’s ‘X Article’ (July 1947)
  - Containment Policy

- Formation of NATO (April 1949)
Causes of the Cold War: Realism

Table 5-1
The Causes of the Origins and Expansion of the Cold War: The Realist Perspective and Levels of Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Realist perspective</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Systemic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
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</table>
|                   | • Bipolarity—no flexibility:  
|                   | —Security dilemma: Balance of terror replaces balance of power  
|                   | —Nuclear deterrence discourages attack by threat before it occurs rather than by defense after an attack occurs; credibility as important as capability; leads to repeated crises to test intentions  
|                   | • Power vacuum: Germany and Japan surrender unconditionally; reconstructed Germany/Japan could tip balance  |
|                   | **Process**         |
|                   | • Dynamics of deterrence spreads conflict to third world  |
| **Foreign policy**| • U.S. and Soviet leaders resolve Cuban Missile Crisis  |
| **Domestic**      | • Soviet Union aggressive militarily in eastern Europe, Baltic, and Balkan states  
|                   | • U.S. expansionist economically in western Europe and Asia  |
| **Individual**    | • Khrushchev takes measure of Kennedy and deploys Cuban missiles  |
# Causes of the Cold War: Liberalism

## Table 5-7

### The Causes of the Origins of the Cold War: The Liberal Perspective and Levels of Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of analysis</th>
<th>Liberal perspective</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Systemic</strong></td>
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</table>
| **Structure**     | United Nations and Baruch Plan to centralize control of nuclear weapons failed:  
|                   | — Flawed global institutions  
|                   | — Small collective security: Great power veto on Security Council ensured preponderance of power; but United States-Soviets clashed  
|                   | — Big collective security: Unanimity in General Assembly but Assembly was subordinate to Council, used only once in Korea because Soviets were absent in Security Council  
|                   | NATO and EC develop collective security at regional level  
| **Process**       | Soviet Union saw Marshall Plan as threat to communist regimes in eastern Europe  
|                   | United States saw spread of Marxist-Leninism as threat to democratic regimes in western Europe  
|                   | Diplomacy: Differences over Poland, Germany, Greece, etc. could have been negotiated  
|                   | Lack of trade  
| **Foreign policy**| Kennedy and Khrushchev cooperate to circumvent domestic hard-liners and settle the Cuban Missile Crisis  
| **Domestic**      |                     |
| **Individual**    | Truman threatened Stalin  
|                   | Roosevelt misinterpreted Stalin  

Causes of the Cold War: Identity

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<th>Level of analysis</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Systemic</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>• Divergent ideologies: No spheres of influence possible because identities of United States and Soviet Union create relationship of enemy rather than rival</td>
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<td>Process</td>
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<td><strong>Foreign policy</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Domestic</strong></td>
<td>• U.S. anti-communism and moralism</td>
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<td>• Soviet Union expansionist ideologically as belief system not as embedded historical dialectic (which is a critical theory perspective)</td>
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<td><strong>Individual</strong></td>
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III. Height of the Cold War

- NSC 68 (April 1950)
- Korean War (1950-53)
- Eisenhower and Khrushchev (1953)
- ‘Secret Speech (1956)
- Hungarian Uprising and Suez (1956)
- Sputnik Launched (1957)
III. Height of the Cold War

- JFK becomes President (1961)
  - “...we shall pay any price, bear any burden...to assure the survival and success of liberty.” (Inaugural Address)
- Cuban Revolution (1959)
- Bay of Pigs Invasion (April 1961)
- Berlin Wall (August 1961)
- Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962)
IV. Vietnam and Detente

- Vietnam Divided
- Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) and Escalation
- Tet Offensive (1968)
- Bombing and Cambodia
- Paris Peace Accords (1973)
- North Vietnamese Victory (April 1975)
IV. Vietnam and Detente

- The Logic of ‘Détente’
  - SALT I and II
  - Opening to China
  - Kissinger’s ‘Linkage Strategy’

- Problems with Détente

- Carter and Human Rights
  - Jackson-Vanik Amendments
  - Soviets in Afghanistan (‘79)
  - Carter Doctrine
V. End Game

- Reagan and the New Cold War
- ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ to ‘Evil Empire’
- Massive US military build-up
- Invasion of Grenada (1983)
- Intermediate Missiles in Europe
- Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI or ‘Star Wars’-1984)

“Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”
V. End Game

- Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-91)
  - *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*
  - ‘New Thinking’ on Foreign Policy
- Tiananmen Square (June 1989)
- Berlin Wall Down (Nov. 1989)
- Failed in Moscow (Aug. 1991)
- Soviet Union Dissolved (Dec. 31, 1991)
## Reagan versus Gorbachev

- John Lewis Gaddis, “Reagan, Gorbachev, and the Completion of Containment”
  - ‘...no administration prior to Reagan’s had deliberately sought to exploit those tensions [within the Soviet system] with a view to destabilizing the Kremlin leadership and accelerating the decline of the regime it ran.’ (p. 285)

- Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence and the End of the Cold War”
  - ‘The available evidence suggests...The critical factor in [the Cold War’s end] was the agenda of Soviet Leaders’ (p. 312)

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**Q:** Who was more important in ending the Cold War – Reagan or Gorbachev?

**Q:** Was the end of the Cold War driven by structural factors beyond any leader’s control?
# Perspectives on the Cold War’s End

## Realist

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## Liberal

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## Identity

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