## DTTF/NB479: Dszquphsboqiz <br> Day 17

- Announcements:
- DES due Thursday.
- Careful with putting it off since Ch 3 test Friday too.
- Today:
- Finish GF(28)
- Rijndael
- Questions?


## AES (Rijndael)

- The S-boxes, round keys, and MixColumn functions require the use of $\mathrm{GF}\left(2^{8}\right)$, so


## Fields (T\&W, 3.11)

- A field is a set of numbers with the following properties:
- Addition, with identity: $a+0=a$ and inverse $a+(-a)=0$
- Multiplication with identity: $a^{*} 1=a$, and inverse
( $a^{*} a^{-1}=1$ for all $a!=0$ )
- Subtraction and division (using inverses)
- Commutative, associative, and distributive properties
- Closure over all four operations
- Examples:
- Real numbers
- $\mathrm{GF}(4)=\left\{0,1, \omega, \omega^{2}\right\}$ with these additional laws: $\mathrm{x}+\mathrm{x}=0$ for all x and $\omega+1=\omega^{2}$.
- GF( $\mathrm{p}^{n}$ ) for prime p is called a Galois Field.


## A Galois field is a finite field with $p^{n}$ elements

 for a prime $p$- There is only one finite field with $p^{n}$ elements for every power of $n$ and prime $p$.
- $G F\left(p^{n}\right)=Z_{p}[X](\bmod P(X))$ is a field with $p^{n}$ elements.
- Wasn't $\mathbb{Z}^{2}[X]\left(\bmod X^{2}+X+1\right)=G F(4) ?$
- Consider $G F\left(2^{n}\right)$ with $P(X)=X^{8}+X^{4}+X^{3}+X+1$ Rijndael uses this!

Finish quiz.

## Back to Rijndael/AES



- Parallels with DES?
- Multiple rounds
- (7 is enough to require brute force)
- Diffusion
- XOR with round keys
- No MixColumn in last round
- Major differences
- Not a Feistel system
- Much quicker diffusion of bits (2 rounds)
- Much stronger against linear, diffy. crypt., interpolation attacks


## ByteSub (BS)

1. Write 128 -bit input a as matrix with 16 byte entries (column major ordering):
$a=\left(\begin{array}{llll}a_{0,0} & a_{0,1} & a_{0,2} & a_{0,3} \\ a_{1,0} & a_{1,1} & a_{1,2} & a_{1,3} \\ a_{2,0} & a_{2,1} & a_{2,2} & a_{2,3} \\ a_{3,0} & a_{3,1} & a_{3,2} & a_{3,3}\end{array}\right)$
2. For each byte, abcdefgh, replace with byte in location (abcd, efgh)

Example: $00011111 \rightarrow$ $\qquad$
Example: $11001011 \rightarrow$
Table 5.1: S-Box for Rijndael

| S-Box |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 99 | 124 | 119 | 123 | 242 | 107 | 111 | 197 | 48 | 1 | 103 | 43 |  |  | 17 |  |
| 202 | 130 | 201 | 125 | 250 | 89 | 71 | 240 | 173 | 212 | 162 | 175 |  | 164 |  | 192 |
| 183 | 253 | 147 | 38 | 54 | 63 | 247 | 204 | 52 | 165 | 229 | 241 | 113 | 216 | 49 | - |
| 4 | 199 | 35 | 195 | 24 | 150 | 5 | 154 | 7 | 18 | 128 | 226 | 235 | 39 | 178 | 117 |
| 9 | 131 | 44 | 26 | 27 | 110 | 90 | 160 | 82 | 59 | 214 | 179 | 41 | 227 | 47 | 132 |
| 83 | 209 | 0 | 237 | 32 | 252 | 177 | 91 | 106 | 203 | 190 | 57 | 74 | 76 | 88 | 207 |
| 208 | 239 | 170 | 251 | 67 | 77 | 51 | 133 | 69 | 249 | 2 | 127 | 80 | 60 | 159 | 168 |
| 81 | 163 | 64 | 143 | 146 | 157 | 56 | 245 | 188 | 182 | 218 | 33 | 16 | 255 | 243 | 210 |
| 205 | 12 | 19 | 236 | 95 | 151 | 68 | 23 | 196 | 167 | 126 | 61 | 100 | 93 | 25 | 115 |
| 96 | 129 | 79 | 220 | 34 | 42 | 144 | 136 | 70 | 238 | 184 |  | 222 | 94 | 11 | 219 |
| 224 | 50 | 58 | 10 | 73 | 6 | 36 | 92 | 194 | 211 | 172 | 98 | 145 | 149 | 228 | 121 |
| 231 | 200 | 55 | 109 | 141 | 213 | 78 | 169 | 108 | 86 |  |  |  | 122 | 174 | 8 |
| 186 | 120 | 37 | 46 | 28 | 166 | 180 | 198 | 232 | 221 | 116 |  |  | 189 |  | 138 |
| 112 | 62 | 181 | 102 | 72 | 3 | 246 | 14 | 97 | 53 | 87 | 185 | 134 | 193 | 29 | 158 |
| 225 | 248 | 152 | 17 | 105 | 217 | 142 | 148 | 155 | 30 | 135 | 233 | 206 | 85 |  | 223 |
| 140 | 161 | 137 | 13 | 191 | 230 | 66 | 104 | 65 | 153 | 45 | 15 | 176 | 84 | 187 | 22 |

## S-box Derivation

The S-box maps byte $x$ to byte $z$ via the function $z=A x^{-1}+b$ :
Input byte $x$ : $x_{7} x_{6} x_{5} x_{4} x_{3} x_{2} x_{1} x_{0}$
Compute the inverse in GF $\left(2^{8}\right): y_{7} y_{6} y_{5} y_{4} y_{3} y_{2} y_{1} y_{0}$ (non-linear, vs. attacks) (use 0 as inverse of 0 )

Compute this linear function $z$ in $G F\left(2^{8}\right)$ :
$\left(\begin{array}{llllllll}1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1\end{array}\right)\left(\begin{array}{l}y_{0} \\ y_{1} \\ y_{2} \\ y_{3} \\ y_{4} \\ y_{5} \\ y_{6} \\ y_{7}\end{array}\right)+\left(\begin{array}{l}1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0\end{array}\right)=\left(\begin{array}{l}z_{0} \\ z_{1} \\ z_{2} \\ z_{3} \\ z_{4} \\ z_{5} \\ z_{6} \\ z_{7}\end{array}\right)$
(to complicate attacks)
(A is simple to implement) b chosen so

$$
\mathrm{z} \neq x \text { and } \mathrm{z} \neq \bar{x}
$$

## ShiftRow (SR)



Shifts the entries of each row by increasing offset:
$c=\left(\begin{array}{cccc}b_{0,0} & b_{0,1} & b_{0,2} & b_{0,3} \\ b_{1,1} & b_{1,2} & b_{1,3} & b_{1,0} \\ b_{2,2} & b_{2,3} & \dot{J}_{2,0} & b_{2,1} \\ b_{3,3} & \grave{J}_{3,0} & 亡_{3,1} & 亡_{3,2}\end{array}\right)$

Gives resistance to newer attacks (truncated differentials, Square attack)

## MixColumn (MC)

Multiply - via GF $\left(2^{8}\right)$ - with the fixed matrix shown.
$d=\left(\begin{array}{cccc}00000010 & 0 . .011 & 0 . .01 & 0 . .01 \\ 00000001 & 0 . .010 & 0 . .011 & 0 . .01 \\ 00000001 & 0 . .01 & 0 . .010 & 0 . .011 \\ 00000011 & 0 . .01 & 0 . .01 & 0 . .010\end{array}\right)\left(\begin{array}{cccc}c_{0,0} & c_{0,1} & c_{0,2} & c_{0,3} \\ c_{1,0} & c_{1,1} & c_{1,2} & c_{1,3} \\ c_{2,0} & c_{2,1} & c_{2,2} & c_{2,3} \\ c_{3,0} & c_{3,1} & c_{3,2} & c_{3,3}\end{array}\right)$

Speed?
64 multiplications, each involving at most 2 shifts + XORs

Gives quick diffusion of bits

## AddRoundKey (ARK)



## XOR the round key with matrix d.

$$
e=d \oplus k_{i}
$$

Key schedule on next slide

## Key Schedule

Write original key as $4 \times 4$ matrix with 4 columns: $\mathrm{W}(0), \mathrm{W}(1), \mathrm{W}(2), \mathrm{W}(3)$. Key for round $i$ is $(W(4 i), W(4 i+1), W(4 i+2), W(4 i+3))$
$(\underbrace{W(0)}_{\mathrm{K}_{0}} W(1) \quad W(2) \quad W(3) \quad \underbrace{W(4)}_{\mathrm{K}_{1}} \quad \ldots W(7) \quad \underbrace{\ldots}_{\mathrm{K}_{10}} \begin{array}{l}W(43)\end{array}$
Other columns defined recursively: $W(i)=W(i-4) \oplus\left\{\begin{array}{cc}T(W(i-1)) & \text { if } 4 \mid i \\ W(i-1) & \text { otherwise }\end{array}\right.$


Highly non-linear. Resists attacks at finding whole key when part is known

192-, 256-bit versions similar

## Decryption

E(k) is:
$\left(A R K_{0}, B S, S R, M C, A R K_{1}, \ldots B S, S R\right.$, MC, ARK ${ }_{9}, \mathrm{BS}, \mathrm{SR}$, ARK $_{10}$ )
Each function is invertible:
 So $D(k)$ is:
$\mathrm{ARK}_{10}$, ISR, IBS, $\mathrm{ARK}_{9}$, IMC, ISR, IBS, ... ARK ${ }_{1}$, IMC, ISR, IBS, ARK ${ }_{0}$ )

Half-round structure:
OWrite $E(k)=A R K,(B S, S R),(M C, A R K), \ldots(B S, S R),(M C, A R K),(B S, S R), A R K$ (Note that last MC wouldn't fit)
$O D(k)=$ ARK, (ISR, IBS), (ARK, IMC), (ISR, IBS), ... (ARK, IMC), (ISR, IBS), ARK
Can write:
$D(k)=$ ARK, (IBS, ISR), (IMC, IARK), ... (IBS, ISR), (IMC, IARK), (IBS, ISR), ARK

## Wrap-up

- Wikipedia's entry has some nice visuals
- But this site has even nicer animations*

