A Bridge Too Far?
Can Britain Continue to Play an
Intermediary Role Between the
United States and Continental Europe?

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Introduction

Every British prime minister since World War II has attempted to manage and exploit his or her nation’s role as a bridge between Washington and the governments of continental Europe. According to Philip Stephens “The grand theory of Britain’s strategic posture holds that these twin associations are mutually reinforcing.” But he goes on to admit that “…the reality has rarely been thus.” Washington has frequently demanded more than sage advice as the price for according London the status of primus inter pares among European allies. On the other side of the Atlantic, influential European leaders have sometimes questioned Britain’s European credentials and characterized London as America’s Trojan horse.

Prime Minister Tony Blair was an especially skilled player of this British game of schaukelpolitik. He cultivated London’s special relationship with Washington while simultaneously burnishing his credentials as an influential supporter of the European Union. Over time, however, Blair was overcome by the tensions inherent in this complex balancing act.

In a recent article, Professor Mark Gilbert of the University of Trento and Johns Hopkins University asked readers to consider the possibility that in the near future Great Britain would become “stranded between two receding shorelines.” In the wake of the
first official visit to the US by Blair’s successor, the time is right to ask whether the two anchor points of the transatlantic bridge are indeed receding, and where this will leave Great Britain. It is always risky to make predictions, of course. But as Donald Rumsfeld, the Bush administration’s former poet in residence, reminds us, we can be more certain about some predictions than others. This paper will focus on what Rumsfeld calls the “known knowns” – structural factors and trends that are likely to persist and that can serve as the basis for cautious speculation about Britain’s future role as a bridge between the US and the EU.iii I will begin with a discussion of factors and trends which are likely to influence British relations with the European Union. I will then turn my attention to the other side of the Atlantic, commenting on structural factors and trends which are likely to be determinative of US-UK relations for the next several years.

The final section of this paper will offer some contingent comments on what Rumsfeld calls the “known unknowns” of British foreign policy, with special emphasis on the impact of recent leadership changes in France, Germany and Great Britain and impending leadership change in the United States.

British Relations with Europe

The experiences of World War II encouraged British policy makers to entertain very different foreign policy attitudes than their counterparts across the Channel. Continental European leaders saw WWII as confirmation of the failure of the Westphalian order, and they soon came to the conclusion that an ambitious program of regional integration was a matter of survival. British leaders, by contrast, saw WWII as a validation of Britain’s indispensable and independent role in the world. To the extent that cooperation with
Europe was required, it was assumed that it should be tactical and conditional, and that it should always be weighed against the priority accorded to the perpetuation of the wartime special relationship with the United States and the demands of empire.

Frustrations with the “long recessional” from empire encouraged many British policy makers to become more sympathetic toward their counterparts in Western Europe. It also encouraged many members of the policy making elite in Britain to become more committed to participation in the process of European integration. But the loss of empire did not have the same psychological impact on the British public that it had on some of the citizens of continental Europe. Residual Commonwealth relations and the special relationship with the US gave Great Britain options and status which was not available to other European imperial powers.

The contrast with France is especially striking. The experience of being forced out of Indochina convinced the French public to accord an increased priority to victory in Algeria (“Lachons l’Asie, prenons l’Afrique”), which in turn made the subsequent loss of the Algerian War that much more damaging. It also contributed to a habit of blaming both Washington and London for foreign policy setbacks which were quite literally intolerable for the French people.iv

The French colonial experience goes a long way toward explaining de Gaulle’s rejection of the British application for EC membership in January of 1963. But students of British-European relations are well advised to read the transcript of de Gaulle’s press conference in which he explained his reasoning. “England is…insular, maritime, linked through its trade, markets, and food supply to very diverse and often very distant countries.” He went on to warn that British membership in the EC would lead to “…a
colossal Atlantic Community, under American dependence and leadership which would soon completely swallow up the European Community.” Margaret Thatcher has observed that “de Gaulle was half right” in his press statement. “Britain *is* different. That is why Britain is still repeatedly at odds with the other European countries.” She goes on to speculate that one of the reasons why British policy makers continued to seek EC membership after the French rejection was the assumption among the British political class that “…if de Gaulle was so determined to keep us out, was that not proof of the beneficial consequences of being in?”

Lady Thatcher’s comments help the reader to understand the persistent ambivalence that the British public feels toward the European experiment. Indeed, as Vernon Bogdanor has concluded:

> The referendum of 1975 seemed to settle for good the question of Britain’s future in Europe. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that it did not in fact do so. Britain, indeed, remains the only one of the 25 (sic) member states that has not fully made up its mind whether it wishes to remain in the EU or leave, and the issue of whether Britain should remain in the EU is now returning to the political agenda.

But Bogdanor also gives us reason to moderate our pessimism about the prospects for future British participation in the European Union.

> At the beginning of a new century, there are signs that a new historical period may be beginning, and that the British view of Europe as a loosely organized grouping of nations, rather than a Community – and a grouping, moreover, with close ties to the United States – may be attracting support, especially among the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe.

> The EU’s constitutional crisis of 2005 is frequently treated as a break-point in a struggle which had been ongoing since Maastricht. French President Jacques Chirac depicted it as a choice between “Anglo-Saxon liberalism” and an “essentially French”
vision of a “strong and organized Europe.”ix The failure of the constitution is better understood, however, as a difficult but necessary stage in a process of reconciliation between the proponents of a wider EU and the proponents of a deeper EU. If managed properly, this post-constitutional dialogue can lay the foundation for pragmatic and incremental progress toward a European Union that can serve the interests of Old and New Europe while also “projecting collective power…in the world.”x It is worth emphasizing that Great Britain has played an essential role in moving the European Union toward this necessary stage in its evolution. London’s leadership in the debate over enlargement is well known. But Mark Gilbert goes farther, claiming that:

…the current EU – with its various national opt-outs… and its sturdily intergovernmental approach to decisionmaking on major questions - is to a significant extent a British creation.”xi

The recent Brussels summit tested just how sturdy the EU’s intergovernmental approach will continue to be. Mr. Blair went into the negotiations committed to restarting the stalled process of European construction and “mak(ing) sure that Europe works more efficiently.” On the other hand, the Prime Minister’s defense of the “four red lines” blocked European efforts, led by France and Spain, to expand EU authority in areas relating to foreign policy and judicial and police functions. Inevitably, Blair was criticized from both sides – with British Conservatives renewing their demands for a referendum on the proposed treaty and “Euro-enthusiasts” like Italian President Romano Prodi calling for British exclusion from the core group in a two-speed Europe.xii

It is by no means certain how Mr. Blair’s successor will react if his government comes under increasing domestic pressure for a referendum on Britain’s future relationship with the EU. It is also at least possible that the arguments of Prodi and
others will become more influential on both sides of the Channel. But neither of these developments seem likely at present. Blair’s red line conditions will probably be enough to short circuit the criticisms of British Euroskeptics, and there is no agreement on what a pioneer group of European states would look like, or what policies it would pursue.

There is also reason to be optimistic about the prospects for British cooperation with the two traditional leaders of the European experiment, France and Germany. It is already apparent that Nicholas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel will not be as inclined as their predecessors to use anti-Americanism as a form of European loyalty test. Indeed, it is much more likely that both Paris and Berlin will be looking for ways to work with London to establish common positions for cooperation with Washington on specific foreign policy issues.

The British government may also find it easier to engage in constructive dialogue with France and Germany on economic matters. This is because the gap between the British version of “Anglo-Saxon liberalism” and the French and German economic models has been narrowing. The “Europeanisation of the British economy” is most evident in terms of public sector spending, which grew in the UK from 37.5% of GDP in 2000 to 45.2% in 2006 (only .9% below Germany). Public sector spending in France is still significantly higher (54.4% of GDP in 2006) but Mr. Sarkozy is committed to addressing this problem.

Finally, there is ample reason for optimism about the potential for cross-Channel cooperation in the field of European defense cooperation. At a time when it is becoming increasingly apparent to all European governments that events anywhere in the world can have a direct or indirect impact on European security, Britain can offer Europe
indispensable experience and unique capabilities for extra-European force projection. Both sides of Channel are also likely to recognize a greater need to coordinate policies toward Europe’s “near abroad” in order to combat terrorism, manage migration and exploit common economic opportunities. More fundamentally, as Etienne Balibar has argued, Europe’s handling of relations with its periphery will ultimately determine Europe’s political identity. It is hard to imagine this being accomplished without British support – and leadership.xv

London has experienced special difficulty when it has been viewed by key European governments as either a direct threat to, or an unnecessary drag on, the process of European integration. De Gaulle’s aforementioned rejection of British membership in the EEC is the most dramatic illustration of this British problem. A more recent example is former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing’s assertion, in the wake of the 2007 Brussels Summit, that if the UK “no longer wishes to participate in moves towards European integration” then London should be given a “special status” so that the European experiment can move forward.xvi As this essay has attempted to demonstrate, however, Britain already has a “special status” in its relations with both the United States and continental Europe, and Britain’s European partners continue to benefit from London’s performance of this role.

To conclude this section, there is no reason for British policy makers to assume that Europe will be a “receding shoreline” in the near future. At least, it need not be. Tony Blair’s successor is not likely to achieve John Major’s goal of placing Britain at the “heart of Europe.” But there is considerable potential for cooperation short of this ideal.
The United States was inclined to support Britain in its quest for special status within the Atlantic Community during the early Cold War period. This was due in part to a sincere American appreciation for the role that the UK had played during World War II. It was also attributable to habits of institutionalized cooperation which had been cultivated by both sides during the war. The British provided the model for the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and helped Washington to establish the precursor to the CIA, the Office of Strategic Services. Britain’s Committee of Imperial Defence was the primary reference for the postwar Eberstadt Committee when it drew up plans for what became (in 1947) the National Security Council. And the 1946 British White Paper on *Central Organisation for Defence* influenced the postwar debates within Washington over the issue of armed forces unification. These institutional ties were in turn reinforced by well-known, but under-appreciated, cultural, political and linguistic ties between the two most important members of the “Magna Carta Club.”

The Marshall Plan provided an early test of the direction of British postwar policy, and of the limits of the special relationship. Washington had made it clear when the Plan was announced that it envisioned economic recovery as an instrument for advancing “closer integration” among West European governments and that it expected Britain to play a constructive and cooperative role in this enterprise. This approach posed a threefold threat to Britain. First, it encouraged Washington to view the UK “just as one European country among many,” (in the words of British Prime Minister Ernest Bevin). Second, by forcing London to compete for funds with all of the other
European applicants, the American plan threatened to reduce the amount of funding that Britain would receive and weaken British control over decisions about the disbursement of those funds. Finally, it ran the risk of constraining British foreign policy in general and London’s management of the sterling bloc in particular. Although some American policy makers (Kennan, in particular) were sympathetic to the argument that Britain deserved special status as a result of its residual imperial responsibilities, most members of the Truman administration resisted and resented London’s efforts to be treated, in Bevin’s words, “on a different basis” than other European governments. British representatives nonetheless succeeded in watering down Washington’s plans for the creation of an authoritative agency to administer the European economic recovery plan. London also received a significantly larger portion of Marshall Aid funding than any other European government.

British policy makers also achieved mixed results in their efforts to extract rewards from the role of “prefect” to the American “headmaster” within NATO. The special role enjoyed by Britain during the Washington Preparatory Talks and the special bilateral arrangements which gave the UK conditional access to US nuclear weapons are generally recognized as examples of British success. British leaders were frequently disappointed, however, when they attempted to leverage loyal support within NATO in order to acquire influence over US defense policies outside of the European region. The American refusal to allow Great Britain to be a founding member of ANZUS and Washington’s brutal response to London’s involvement in the Suez intervention are two well-known examples.
Margaret Thatcher contends that Suez convinced “most of the British political classes” that “Britain could no longer rely on the United States and that, as the Commonwealth adopted a diminishing political importance, it was necessary instead to join the European Common Market.” But she goes on to observe that this reorientation of British foreign policy was nonetheless interpreted by many British policy makers in the context of the US-UK special relationship. She quotes Harold Macmillan in a statement to the Cabinet in April 1961:

…if the countries of the Common Market formed a close political association under French leadership, this would create a further division in Europe and would also have a disruptive effect within the Atlantic community. It might be averted if the United Kingdom…could join the political association of the Six and help to build in Europe a stable political structure which would prevent France now, and Germany later, from attaining too dominant a position.

Lady Thatcher commends Macmillan for his “appreciation of geopolitical realities” and credits him for having “encapsulated in these words what might be called the Atlanticist argument for Europe.” One can also find in Macmillan’s statement ample justification for de Gaulle’s aforementioned rejection of the first British attempt to join the EEC.

London has been making the “Atlanticist argument for Europe” ever since. In general it has been actively supported, and encouraged, by Washington. In a few cases, most notably, the Saint Malo summit of 1998, London placed itself out in front of Washington on a controversial issue (in this case, EU defense cooperation). Leo Michel reminds readers that “Washington’s initial response was polite but distinctly chilly.” Blair did succeed in reassuring key US policy makers that the creation of a European Rapid Reaction force was in America’s interest, but as Philip Stephens correctly concludes, “A certain ambiguity was part of the price of the bargain.”
When Blair reassured his advisers that he would be able to “sort out Clinton” on the issue of European defense cooperation, he was encouraged by his close personal relationship with the American President.\textsuperscript{xxix} There is no way to foresee the interpersonal dynamics between Blair’s successor and Bush’s successor. On the other hand, some structural characteristics of the contemporary international system provide a reliable basis for speculation on the future of the US-British special relationship.

The most important characteristic of the current international system is America’s enduring preeminence. Tony Blair was especially inclined to publicly accept, and celebrate, Washington’s hegemonic status. But even the most vociferous European critics of the American “hyperpower” agree with former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that the US is the “indispensable nation” for most of the major challenges of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century.

On the other hand, Washington is today, and will likely remain for the foreseeable future, a chastened hegemon. In the words of Timothy Garton Ash, “…hubris was punished, as it always is. In this case, it was punished on the streets of Iraq…”\textsuperscript{xxx} Of course, the problems that Washington now confronts are attributable to much more than the fact that “the ox is in the ditch” in Iraq (Sam Nunn’s fortuitous phrase). Indeed, there are some intriguing similarities between America’s various and converging problems at the start of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century and the situation of Great Britain at the start of the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. In both cases, a period of triumphalism (symbolized for Washington by the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall and for Great Britain by the Diamond Jubilee celebration of 1897) has been followed by a period of frustration, recrimination and strategic confusion. In the case of Washington, this mood is directly attributable to the
American quagmire in Iraq. In the case of London, it was largely a result of the public reaction to the government’s management of the Boer War.\textsuperscript{xxx} America today is also similar to early 20\textsuperscript{th} century Great Britain in its appreciation of the problems of imperial overstretch, although it has not yet accepted, as the UK did at the turn of the century, the need for fundamental overhaul of the institutions responsible for the management of empire.\textsuperscript{xxxi}

Contemporary Washington is also similar to pre-World War II Britain in its increased sensitivity of the rise of powerful and ambitious competitors. But here we must take note of an important difference between the American and British situations. While London had ample reason to worry about the growing military capability and the global military ambitions associated with German \textit{Weltpolitik}, Washington’s global peer competitors threaten to out-compete the US in the realms of “soft power” (diplomacy) and “sticky power” (economics).\textsuperscript{xxxii} China comes closest to a 21\textsuperscript{st} century version of Wilhelmine Germany in terms of its campaign of military modernization and its outstanding points of dispute with the dominant power. But even the most fevered American proponents of anti-Chinese containment recognize that Beijing’s top priority is the management of a “peaceful rise” to global economic prominence. As a recent report in \textit{The Economist} concluded:

\begin{quote}
The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] knows its weakness. It has few illusions that China can compete head-on with the Americans militarily. The Soviet Union’s determination to do so is widely seen in China as the cause of its collapse.\textsuperscript{xxxiv}
\end{quote}

This is not to imply that the United States does not face very real security threats at present. But the most immediate and foreseeable threats are not traditional nation states which can be deterred or eliminated by traditional military instruments. Rather
they are transnational threats associated with an increasingly globalized world. The direct terrorist threat posed by “superempowered angry men” is the most immediate and demanding problem. But Washington has also become increasingly aware of the direct and indirect threats to human security posed by the interaction of poverty, pandemics, environmental degradation and resource depletion.

All of the above-mentioned characteristics of the current international situation predict to a re-valuation of “assertive multilateralism” as a cornerstone of American grand strategy. They also predict to a return to a ‘normal’ foreign policy which balances military instruments with diplomatic and economic instruments. A normal foreign policy will also be more inclined to ask “what are the issues?” and “what are our interests?” than “who is the enemy?” A normal foreign policy will be more multifaceted and more globally engaged. It will also accept (grudgingly, in many cases) the need to work through intergovernmental organizations to achieve and sustain cooperation. Reconciling the “assertive” and the “multilateral” elements of this new foreign policy will be no easier for George Bush’s successor than it was for Bill Clinton. But whoever replaces Mr. Bush in the White House will soon come to recognize that they have no choice. This will be especially obvious in Iraq, where new forms of international cooperation will be necessary to assist Washington in finding a tolerable exit.

A more multilateralist and multifaceted American foreign policy will probably result in a modest demotion of Great Britain in US grand strategy. Furthermore, a more globally active Washington will necessarily diminish the diplomatic attention that the US will accord to Europe as a whole. We are already seeing the first signs of this
relativization of Europe, with the increased diplomatic attention that the Bush administration has accorded to the Asia-Pacific and Latin America.

On the other hand, a less unilateralist and less militaristic American foreign policy will make it much easier for Great Britain to continue to play a transatlantic bridging role, by reducing the pressure on London to choose between the US and the EU. The normalization of American foreign policy will also play to some of Great Britain’s established foreign policy priorities, as articulated at the UK-led Gleneagles G-8 Summit of July 2005. These priorities included a doubling of international aid to the developing world, cancellation of outstanding third world debt, increased investment in health care in the poorest regions of the world, and a coordinated international effort to address the causes and consequences of global warming. Furthermore, to the extent that a more globally engaged America is less focused on Europe, it will make it easier for all European governments (including London) to carry on a necessary discussion about the future shape and content of the European Union.

**Conclusion: Choices for the Prime Minister**

Readers may have noticed that I have written this entire paper without once mentioning Gordon Brown’s name. This is because neither Mr. Brown’s record as Chancellor of the Exchequer nor his statements or actions since he was designated as Blair’s successor provide us with enough information to make confident predictions about his foreign policy. We can nonetheless conclude with some general comments about what we think we know about Mr. Brown.
First, the Prime Minister does not seem to be as emotionally invested in the US-UK special relationship as his predecessor. Yet *The Economist* has concluded that Mr. Brown is “more American than he looks,” because of his “enthusiasm for market economics,” as confirmed by his reported interventions in the negotiations surrounding the recent Brussels Summit. His public commitment to oppose terrorism “globally – with all the means at our disposal” should also be a source of reassurance to Washington. It is nonetheless much too early to conclude, as Mark Leonard has done, that Brown is an “instinctive” Atlanticist, and it is difficult to assess the accuracy, or the significance, of Leonard’s claim that Brown “has better connections in Washington than any incumbent prime minister since Churchill, boasting a circle of friends that includes left-wing democrats…and Republicans.

Mark Leonard also provides readers with reasons to be skeptical about the future of the special relationship, citing a “senior Brownite” who implies that the Prime Minister will not be comfortable with the situation of “public support, private criticism” that characterized Tony Blair’s relationship with Washington. This individual criticizes Blair for “reduc(ing) Britain to part of the inter-agency process in Washington.” This situation may chafe from time to time. But surely Gordon Brown will also recognize the benefits associated with this situation of extraordinary trust and access. Indeed, it can be argued that Britain’s status as “part of the inter-agency process” represents the culmination of a strategy of “playing Greece to America’s Rome” that has guided British foreign policy for six decades. It is hard to imagine that, barring a major crisis in US-British relations, the Prime Minister would voluntarily choose to abandon this unique and influential position.
Several commentators have also argued that Mr. Brown seems to be less of an “instinctive European” than Tony Blair. Douglas Fraser of The Herald claims that over the last decade Brown “…has tended to treat his EU counterparts with contempt.” He was also played a key role in discouraging Blair from seeking British membership in the Eurozone. But Brown’s actions during this period may have been primarily role-determined – a function of the former Chancellor’s responsibilities for defending and celebrating the British Pound. There is also nothing in Brown’s (admittedly embryonic) relationship with Sarkozy and Merkel comparable to the personal animosity which existed between Blair and Chirac during the period leading up to the Iraq intervention. According to Philip Stephens, 

By now Blair had been persuaded by intelligence reports that Chirac was indeed intent on ruining him politically in Europe….The attitude toward the French in Downing Street was as belligerent as it had ever been during the long history of rivalry between the two nations.

On substantive EU policy issues - qualified majority voting, European foreign policy, etc. - Mr. Brown gives the impression that he will be even more protective of British sovereignty than his predecessor. But Mr. Brown may find that these issues are more manageable than in the past, if The Economist is correct in its conclusion that “with the accession of new members, and the election of new leaders in France and Germany, Europe’s ideological center of gravity has shifted in Britain’s favour.

The new Prime Minister is frequently referred to as a “pragmatist” and a “technocrat” who suffers from a “charisma deficit.” And there is no reason to believe that Brown will pursue his predecessor’s “overtly values-based” style of foreign policy. There do appear to be issues, however, about which he feels passionately,
including the “emergency” of global poverty and the challenge of infant mortality in the third world. These themes were at the center of Brown’s appeal at the United Nations for a “great coalition of conscience.” The Prime Minister has also provided early indications of his willingness to place his nation in the lead on the crisis in Darfur, and to back up diplomatic initiatives with a significant (100 million Pound) financial commitment.

All of these very early guesses about the future direction of British foreign policy are vulnerable to a number of unforeseeable developments. Brown’s relations with Sarkozy and Merkel could be affected by a downturn in Franco-German relations. British domestic politics might affect the tone and content Brown’s management of the special relationship if the Prime Minister believes he is becoming vulnerable to characterization as a new breed of poodle. Britain’s aforementioned status as part of the interagency process in Washington could be undermined by transatlantic recriminations as a result of the seemingly intractable Iraqi situation.

The most troubling possibility - for Britain, for Europe, and for the international community - would be a situation in which imperial overstretch, a black hole in Iraq, and persistent and worldwide anti-Americanism combine to fuel the isolationist impulse which is always just below the surface in American debates about foreign policy. The good news is that a resurgence of American isolationism is a very remote possibility, and that it is much more likely that Washington, particularly a post-Bush Washington, will pursue an Americanized form of benign hegemony. If the US will not be the “humble nation” that George W. Bush once promised American voters, it will at least be a more cautious and discriminating superpower that is likely to be more appreciative of, and
attentive to, its long-standing allies. This will make it much easier for nations like France and Germany to reconcile their interests and policies with America’s. It will also make it much easier for Gordon Brown to continue to pursue the strategy that Timothy Garton Ash has had the temerity to describe as the “Blair bridge project.”

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8. Ibid
11. Gilbert, pp. 84-5.
21. According to Roy Gardner, Britain received $3.297 billion in Marshall Aid between 1948 and 1951. Comparable figures for the next largest recipients (France, Germany and Italy) were $2.296 billion, $1.448 billion, and $1.204 billion, respectively). See figure 5.1 in “The Marshall Plan Fifty Years Later: Three What-ifs and a When,” in The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After , edited by Martin Schain (New York, Palgrave, 2001), p. 120.
23. See Stuart and Tow, The Limits of Alliance…, in particular, chapters 8 to 12.
xxxiv Margaret Thatcher, *Statecraft*, p. 363.
xxxv Ibid, p. 364.
xxxvi Ibid.
xxxix Ibid, p. 115.
xxlii In the British case, these concerns led to high-level deliberations which culminated in the creation of the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1904. See the very valuable history of this Committee written by Franklyn Johnson, *Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence, 1885-1959* (London, Oxford University Press, 1960).
xxliv “The Long March to be a Superpower,” August 4, 2007, p. 23.
xxxiv Ibid.


*Free world…*, p. 34.