
Taming the Awkward State? Europeanisation and the Changing Face of UK EU Policy Making under Blair*

Scott James

**European Policy Research Unit (EPRU)
University of Manchester
scott.james@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk**

**Paper presented at the 'Britain After Blair' Conference, Chicago,
29th August 2007.**

PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT AUTHOR'S PERMISSION

Abstract

This paper analyses the pervasive and profound changes to EU policy making that have taken place within the UK core executive since 1997 and attempts to evaluate and explain the Blair government's strategy for normalising relations with the EU. Aiming to add value to existing theories of Europeanisation, the study sets out four distinctive modes through which administrative change can occur as a consequence of EU membership – goodness of fit, competitive uploading, institutional fusion, and discursive strategy. It moves beyond traditional institutionalist accounts by employing a strategic-relational network framework in order to map the changing face of policy coordination and decision-making within the Whitehall EU 'network' and to explain how the structure of the network conditions the nature of UK EU policy. The study argues that faced with countervailing centripetal and centrifugal pressures for change derived in large part from the EU, the Blair government's strategy has been double-edged: day-to-day coordination of EU policy has become increasingly informal, ad hoc and delegated downwards to departmental players; while the role of the centre has been greatly strengthened in order to provide more effective strategic direction and political leadership. It goes on to suggest however that despite this seemingly coherent strategy for reforming the UK's 'awkward state', many critical structural features of the UK core executive continue to undermine efforts to project an unambiguously constructive UK EU policy.

*This paper is based on the testimonies of thirty-six senior officials and ministers from across Whitehall that were conducted between July 2005 and January 2007, and who agreed to be interviewed on a strictly non-attributable basis.

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to explore the significant and sustained pressure of adaptation and adjustment that European Union (EU) membership exerts upon national core executives: not only so as to ensure compliance with prescribed policy or institutional templates, but also so as to take advantage of the political and institutional opportunity structures that the EU represents. With this in mind, the study aims to address the following questions:

- How and why has the UK core executive adapted to ensure the effective coordination and projection of national EU policy since 1997?
- To what extent can core executive change be attributed to pressures of Europeanisation?
- How has core executive change affected the capacity of the Labour government to formulate and articulate a constructive EU policy?

The paper begins by addressing the conceptual and analytical challenge to Europeanisation posed by adaptation within the core executive for the purpose of ‘projection’ rather than ‘reception’. It suggests that we understand Europeanisation as potentially operating through four distinctive modes, each of which produces divergent effects within government. In seeking to move beyond traditional institutionalist approaches, it proposes the use of a strategic-relational network framework in order to delineate the nature of policy networks that exists within core executives for the purpose coordinating and projecting national EU policy, to explain how and why network adaptation occurs, and to evaluate the likely impact upon network outcomes (EU policy). The utility of this framework is demonstrated through an analysis of the EU network located within the UK core executive and the nature of the changes enacted since 1997 by the Blair government in the pursuit of a more constructive EU policy.

Europeanisation as ‘Projection’


The Europeanisation literature has long been polarised between those who restrict the application of the concept to the process by which member states *download* European policies, structures, norms or values, and those that insist we also incorporate the way member states try to *upload* their domestic preferences into the EU policy making arena (see Borzel 2002)¹. This paper is critical of the former, uni-directional perspective for viewing the member state as the passive recipient of adaptational requirements from the EU, ignoring the circular nature of the process in which national core executives may adapt for the purpose of maximising uploading. Bulmer and Burch (2000) suggest that Europeanisation triggers a two-stage response within member states. *Reception* refers to a process in which EU political and economic dynamics are downloaded into the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making, while *projection* relates to a process of domestic adjustment through which the successful uploading of governmental preferences may be secured (see figure 1).² The subject of adjustment in this case will relate to vertical (state-to-EU) and horizontal (inter- or intra-state) mechanisms of coordination, communication and networking that exist within and

¹ Borzel (2002) makes this valuable conceptual distinction between ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’, the former constituting the ‘return loop’ of the Europeanisation process by which member states try to minimise the future cost of downloading.

² In making this distinction, we are better placed to draw an analytical line between Europeanisation and European integration. Reception and projection constitute a legitimate focus of analysis for Europeanisation as they relate to processes of change at the domestic level instigated or necessitated by the demands of effective uploading/downloading for which EU membership serves as a necessary condition for change.

between national core executives for the purpose of projecting governmental preferences into the EU policy process.

Figure 1. Europeanisation as Reception and Projection (Adapted from Borzel 2005).




Europeanisation as projection requires us to acknowledge that institutional ‘misfit’ between the domestic and EU levels, and the adaptational pressure that this generates cannot constitute a necessary condition for adaptation.³ It is self-evident that the EU has no claims to competence in this area. Furthermore, whereas for reception supranational institutions frequently define the extent of misfit with EU obligations, for projection it is domestic policy makers that must interpret and respond to perceptions of incongruence between domestic coordination arrangements and the EU policy process. Misfit in this instance is therefore entirely subjective, determined by what constitutes effective projection.

The model of Europeanisation presented here accounts for both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of projection: the intergovernmental projection of national preferences into the

³ The ‘goodness of fit’ model suggests that domestic change is determined by the level of compatibility or ‘fit’ between Europeanisation processes – understood as norms, rules, regulations, institutions, and procedures – and their domestic equivalents. The degree of ‘fit’ or ‘misfit’ between the two generates adaptational pressures for domestic change: the better the fit, the less change will occur (see Knill 2001; Cowles *et al* 2001).

EU policy process, and bilateral interaction between national policy makers.⁴ Figure 2 distinguishes between four distinctive modes through which domestic adaptation within the core executive for the purpose of projection may occur. Each mode corresponds to a necessary condition and will give rise to divergent effects as defined in figure 3, although none is mutually exclusive.

Figure 2. Europeanisation as Projection



⁴ This leads us to reject Borzel's (2002) two-level game metaphor and instead draw inspiration from Radaelli's model of multiple vertical and horizontal mechanisms of domestic change (see Radaelli 2003).

Figure 3. The Four Modes of Europeanisation as Projection

Institutional compliance relates to a form of domestic change driven by direct adaptational pressures necessitated by specific EU obligations, and which therefore gives rise to institutional convergence between member states. This would include for example the administrative requirements outlined by the Copenhagen criteria for the Central and East European states, but also domestic adaptation within existing states triggered by the extension of EU competence that necessitates the incorporation of new domestic policy makers into new Council and working group formations.

Competitive uploading assumes that governments are effectively in competition to upload their preferences and will consequently compare their performance against one another. Differential empowerment of national core executives, at either the inter- or intra-state levels, serves as the necessary condition for change. Changes in EU level opportunity structures (such as the extension of qualified majority voting, or further enlargement) will benefit or 'empower' some core executives and/or departments with effective mechanisms of projection over others. Those perceived as less successful at uploading, and are therefore 'disempowered' by the changes, may choose to reform in order to improve their performance. In doing so the member states set in train a 'spillover' dynamic in which reform in one state effectively forces others to follow suit. The effect of competitive uploading should be optimization rather than convergence, whereby each member state and/or department strives to optimize their capacity to project.

Institutional fusion, as with the fourth mode, relates to change instigated for the purpose of exploiting the opportunities for adaptation afforded by EU membership. Fusion here refers to processes of interaction, strategic networking, and socialisation through which national policy makers may engage in external learning, share ideas about best practice, and facilitate the transfer or emulation of administrative arrangements. The outcome is a growing web of interconnections and networks between national policy-makers which underpins the increasing interdependency of national core executives.

Discursive strategy describes a process of domestic change that is not triggered by European integration at all – rather, domestic actors may seek to exploit the perceived 'need for adaptation' (Kallestrup 2002). The EU is instead exploited as a source of legitimation in order to justify, frame, facilitate or constrain otherwise unrelated domestic reforms. Although Europeanisation may be exploited as a discursive strategy, EU membership still serves as a necessary condition for domestic change.


A Framework for Analysis

Having provided a conceptual basis for studying Europeanisation as projection, the paper sets out a coherent analytical framework to elucidate and explain the nature of domestic change, and its impact on policy outcomes, within national core executives.

Conventional attempts to do so borrow extensively from the historical institutionalist toolbox. In doing so many accounts try to explain the divergent effects of EU membership in different member states on the basis of distinctive macro-level structural characteristics such as institutional and procedural arrangements, and organisational or administrative cultures. However by trying to explain the nature and direction of institutional change using a set of intervening variables which are entirely derivative of the state, they risk committing an explanatory tautology which prevents meaningful comparative analysis of different case studies (see Adshead 2002: 27-8). This paper aims to add value to existing accounts by

employing a policy network analysis as an organising concept to analyse core executive change. By focusing on the nature of network – rather than institutional – change, the framework extends the analysis from the conventional objects of Europeanisation – structures and procedures – towards a consideration of the power relationships that connect them. By conceptualising these relationships as patterns of resource dependency and strategic networking, the framework is able to map the boundaries of the policy area more systematically, offers a more dynamic picture of institutional change, and provides potential explanatory variables for changes in policy outcomes (Gains 2004: 562).

Figure 4. A Model of Network Development



The network framework outlined here aims to develop and adapt the strategic-relational network framework put forward by Hay (1998) and Hay and Richards (2000).⁵ Figure 4 summarises the process of network development. Once a network is constituted through the recruitment of strategic players, its vertical and horizontal characteristics provide an objective

⁵ The framework does not offer a theory of networks *per se*, but rather to apply a theory of collective strategic action to the social practice of networking. It recognises that strategic action produces direct effects upon the structured context within which it takes place by facilitating strategic learning (Hay 1998: 43). Players will utilise this knowledge in an attempt to reshape and reconfigure the network within which they operate in order to realise their strategic interests and policy preferences.

toolkit by which to systematically map, measure and compare the nature of network adaptation over time (see figure 5).

Figure 5. Network Characteristics (Dependent Variables)

Vertical Characteristics

Roles represent the formally defined function and location of key players within the network as set out in statute (Knoke 1990). We would expect to find that the role of key actors is much more stable and displays characteristics of path dependency, evolving only incrementally and underpinning the continuity of policy.

Resources held by players shape the dynamic nature of relationships and internal hierarchies within the network. In doing so the concept recognises that the exchange of valuable strategic resources translates into structured patterns of power dependency (see Marsh and Rhodes 1992). Attention to these resources and their manifestation through the day-to-day interaction of players offers a far more dynamic picture of adaptation than formally defined roles.

Horizontal Characteristics

Structures refer to those features that configure the pattern of network behaviour, provide stable forums for decision making, coordination, and consultation; embed strategic interaction between players in regularised practices and procedures; and 'lock' players into ordered relationships of mutual interdependency. As key nodal points with formal decision making powers and located at the crossroads of information flows, structures bestow status and authority onto those players that are recruited to them.

Networking relates to the frequency and quality of strategic interaction between network players (both within and between core executives) and the number, density and the intensity of connections between them. Strategic interaction will therefore refer to formal and informal forms of networking, established channels of communication and information distribution, as well as internal mechanisms and programmes designed to facilitate strategic learning (such as training and awareness raising).

Exogenous causal factors relate to changes in domestic or EU-level opportunity structures that provide domestic network players with new or altered opportunities or constraints for strategic action. Where this does not produce network failure and termination, it may trigger network adaptation as policy makers attempt to exploit or minimise the impact of these shifting structures so as to maintain or enhance the network's capacity to secure its strategic interests. Crucially, the nature of network adaptation, and thus future network outcomes, is conditioned by a number of key intervening variables (see figure 6).

Figure 6. Endogenous Intervening Variables

Informal veto points refer to those players or structural positions at which network change can be effectively delayed, amended, or vetoed. The framework does not explicitly refer simply to veto players: the concept of a formal veto is inappropriate for analysis of decision-making within the core executive for the explicit or tacit agreement of every network player is not formally required for network change to be undertaken.

Centralisation within a network reflects the strategic balance of power between network players, shaping the extent of agreement necessary for adaptation to occur and determining which key players are responsible for network reconfiguration. Hence where power is distributed asymmetrically and responsibility for reform is centralised within a single network player, it may be possible to instigate adaptation with little explicit agreement. Conversely where power and responsibility is more evenly divided, a degree of consensus may be required. The level of centralisation will also condition the capacity of the centre to provide both political leadership and strategic direction for EU policy which rely on centrally located players with the resources and willingness to perform these defining roles.

Institutionalisation here relates to the extent to which decision making and coordination are characterised by a high degree of ‘formalisation’ (characterised by extensive committee structures, regular meetings, strong bureaucratic procedures, and clear policy guidelines) or ‘informalisation’ (in which ad hoc meetings or interpersonal correspondence predominate, procedures are weak, and formal guidelines non-existent). This variable will have critical implications for the effectiveness and efficiency with which decisions can be made, the precision and clarity of negotiating positions, and the fluidity and adaptability of the network to shifting EU-level opportunity structures.


Institutional memory can be defined as the body of knowledge, from formal data and information through to informal skills and experiences, which is essential to the continued and effective achievement of strategic objectives. It includes all those mechanisms and procedures that exist for identifying, accumulating, and sustaining knowledge. Institutional memory therefore conditions the capacity of network players to engage in strategic learning.

The systematic application of these variables to network change helps us to begin to explain distinctive patterns of adaptation and their implications for network outcomes. Because they are endogenous to networks rather than characteristic of the wider core executive within which they are located, they can account for the distinctive features of the state without being dependent upon them for explanation.

Network Adaptation since 1997

In order to explain the nature of change within the UK core executive since 1997 as a consequence of EU membership, this paper maps the core of the network responsible for coordinating and projecting UK EU policy. We are here concerned with just five key players: No.10, the Cabinet Office European Secretariat (COES), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Treasury, and the UK Permanent Representation (UKRep).

Figure 7. The Inner Core Network after 1997



Through the application of the framework outlined above, the paper outlines in detail the nature of adaptation according to the four defining characteristics. It then utilises the four intervening variables in an attempt to evaluate the nature of change under the Blair government, and the real or potential impact that this has had on EU policy.

Roles

The European Secretariat is located at the very heart of the EU network and traditionally fulfils three distinctive roles in the management of EU policy: to ensure that departmental negotiating positions are coherent and consistent (coordination); provide neutral interdepartmental arbitration to resolve disputes (brokerage); and to drive forward the government's overarching, longer term objectives on Europe (strategic) (Cabinet Office 2005). Since 1997 the strategic role of the COES has been strengthened through the promotion of the head to permanent secretary with an office inside No.10, and with the title of Prime Minister's Advisor on European Policy.

As a consequence of these reforms around two-thirds of its workload since 1997 became prescriptive and devoted to delivering Blair's strategic priorities across Whitehall – the rest focused on interdepartmental coordination and dispute resolution.⁶ Although the secretariat's authority traditionally stems from its impartiality, it acknowledges that its strategic role necessitates that it provides 'purposeful' brokerage which can direct departments (Cabinet Office 2005). Yet desk officers are open about this potential conflict of interest, ensuring that they are explicit at all times about which role they are performing.⁷ Despite this tensions have

⁶ As formally enshrined in the re-wording of the European Secretariat's function from "to drive forward the *Government's* strategic agenda" to "drive forward the *Prime Minister's* strategic agenda" (my italics) (Cabinet Office 2002, 2003).

⁷ To the extent that desk officers will actually use Cabinet Office or No.10 headed notepaper for correspondence depending on their perceived role at different times.

arisen as a consequence of the secretariat's increasing use of No.10 special advisors, but also with No.10 itself where the consensus Whitehall view is at odds with the Prime Minister.

The power of the COES remains conditional on three variables: the personality of the head; its perceived closeness to the Prime Minister; and the authority and interest of the Prime Minister in EU policy. During the 1980s for example the then head, David Williamson, effectively served as Thatcher's *de facto* principle policy advisor for EU affairs. By contrast, the low key role of Williamson's three successors reflected the fact that Major preferred to rely on the FCO private secretary for EU policy advice. Blair, like Thatcher, questioned why he had to rely on a 'go-between' (the FCO private secretary) for policy advice, preferring to have someone located within No.10. Blair consequently relied heavily for policy guidance on the secretariat, then headed by Brian Bender, who was able to support Peter Mandelson as 'roving European ambassador' within the Cabinet Office.⁸ However the extent of this dependency gave rise to concern amongst senior FCO officials about their diminished role, culminating in the negotiation of an informal concordat to limit Bender's potential influence.

In the run up to the 2001 general election two factors led Blair to conclude that formal reform was necessary: relations between Blair and Bender's successor, David Bostock, were not as effective; and with a referendum on the European single currency a real possibility, Blair wanted a trusted advisor to deliver his priorities. The appointment of Sir Stephen Wall in 2000 was pivotal in asserting the strategic role of the COES, and by formalising the changes effectively introduced under Bender, constitutes a critical juncture in the network's development.⁹ Initial anxiety across Whitehall that the appointment broke the convention that the head be recruited from a home department was tempered by the independence Wall had demonstrated as Permanent Representative. Although consideration was given to reverting back to the old system after his departure in 2004, the reforms were retained not least because of the salience of the Constitutional Treaty ratification process. However replacing Wall with a second diplomat lacking UKRep experience (Kim Darroch) meant that at times the COES was unable to wield the same authority across Whitehall.

Resources

The significance of the reforms instigated by Blair becomes clear when we consider their implications for patterns of resource exchange across the network. Prior to 1997, the resource base of the COES had failed to keep pace with the rapid pace of integration (with only 20 staff in the mid-1990s), restricting it to tactical coordination with little strategic or planning capacity (Bulmer and Burch 1998). By 2007 the number of senior staff had increased to 4 and the number of Grade 7 desk officers doubled since 1998 to 12, with a total full-time staff of 34.

The head's integration into the No.10 machine is important symbolically as it heightens awareness across government that desk officers carry the authority and legitimacy of the Prime Minister to whom policy leads increasingly look for direction. At a practical level it provides greater access to expertise, intelligence, and critical information flows via the No.10 email system. Contact with Blair increased markedly, providing better quality feedback, access to a greater variety of meetings, and helping to keep EU issues on the No.10 agenda. The capacity of the COES to engage in strategic thinking and high-level networking across Europe was also enhanced until 2004 by the appointment of a No.10 special advisor on Europe (Roger Liddle). In addition, promotion to permanent secretary boosted the status of

⁸ Ostensibly because Blair viewed the then Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, as too 'Eurosceptic' and not 'one of us'. This contributed towards the marginalisation of the FCO as a whole.

⁹ As one senior official acknowledged, even at the height of Williamson's powers in the 1980s the secretariat never seriously challenged the FCO's position, which contrasts with the situation today.

the position, enabled more qualified officials to be attracted to the post, and offered access to the wider network of Whitehall permanent secretaries.

Although No.10 continues to rely on bilateral expertise to execute EU policy, the FCO's role has diminished with respect to policy formulation and coordination¹⁰. Although its Europe Directorate enjoyed a brief expansion in response to eastern enlargement and the 2005 presidency, more recently its resource base has been rationalised and attaches reallocated to posts outside Europe (FCO 2006: 48-9)¹¹. Although for a brief period the appointment of Mandelson as 'roving European ambassador' came close to constituting a cabinet rank Europe minister and serious consideration was given to establishing a separate ministry for Europe, the position was never formally enshrined due to Whitehall opposition. Similarly, while Blair periodically sought to exploit the position of Minister for Europe more effectively, the ill-defined role, a deficiency of strategic resources, and high turnover (there have been eight incumbents since 1997) prevented them from making a significant mark on EU policy.¹²

By contrast, UKRep has nearly doubled in size since 1997 and emerged as a *de facto* independent player in its own right. The importance of the weekly Friday meeting between Blair's European Advisor and the Permanent Representative has cemented its power, making it increasingly difficult for policy leads to oppose their Brussels-based colleagues. Furthermore, although formally accountable to the Foreign Secretary, promoting the head of the COES to the same grade as the Permanent Representative has rendered the latter increasingly answerable directly to the Prime Minister.

Explaining Network Change: The Importance of Europeanisation

At its simplest the growing influence of the No.10-Cabinet Office axis, and the subsequent marginalisation of the FCO, has been driven by Blair's desire to project a more constructive European policy. Reform was also undoubtedly conditioned by the wider 'joined-up government' agenda and Blair's emphasis on policy delivery (in this case uploading), as well as strategic calculations – the need to counter the Treasury's *de facto* control of any decision over the European single currency.

However accounts which focus simply on domestic dynamics fail to explain why the reforms progressed much further for international and European policy than for domestic policy – the head of the Overseas and Defence Secretariat was also moved to No.10 in 2000 while the head of the Economic and Domestic Secretariat was not. Nor can they account for their durability under Brown. We must therefore look to non-domestic, longer-term trends such as Europeanisation, which have been reinforced, and in some cases, accelerated by Labour.

EU membership has profoundly reshaped patterns of power dependency within national core executives. With the establishment of the European Council in 1975, direct adaptational pressure from Brussels strengthened the influence of heads of state/government and their

¹⁰ A former senior official acknowledged that the capacity of No.10/Cabinet Office, in terms of staffing and expertise, has been strengthened to such an extent that they are 'getting pretty close' to the point at which the Prime Minister is able to bypass the FCO for policy advice and strategic thinking on Europe.

¹¹ Figures confirm that the number of officials linked to the directorate (both at home and overseas) was reduced after 2001 to around 700 by 2004, to 660 at the start of the Presidency, and have since declined further.

¹² For example from 2000 Keith Vaz was given specific responsibility for public diplomacy and for chairing a new inter-ministerial coordinating committee (MINECOR). In 2005 the salience of the Constitutional Treaty and likely referendum led Blair to invite Douglas Alexander to attend the full cabinet, a courtesy also extended to his successor Geoff Hoon with additional responsibility for the Balkans and chairing an interdepartmental committee.

officials by providing valuable strategic resources¹³. Since then the demands of competitive uploading have exerted further pressure for enhancing the power of the centre, driven by the real or potential risk of the relative disempowerment of those core executives that are ineffective at projecting policy preferences through prime ministerial articulation. The spillover effect of these transnational dynamics ensures that once a critical mass of governments respond by centralising power, so other member states are effectively forced to emulate them.

Three developments in particular underpin this process: the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV); new areas of EU competence; and successive enlargement. By placing a greater premium on effective coordination so as to anticipate issue linkages and to synchronise negotiating tactics which only players located at the centre can realistically provide, QMV generated powerful pressures for reform that could not be adequately addressed by the Major government because it was forced to play down the impact of integration. Furthermore, the further expansion of EU competence over the 1990s into areas of high politics has imposed a greater burden on prime ministerial/cabinet offices, forcing them to recruit additional staff. More recently, successive enlargements and the absence of effective decision-making reform in the Council mean that issues are increasingly debated in informal pre-Council discussions between heads of government/state (see Tallberg 2007). Similarly at official level, the unwieldy nature of working group meetings forces national policy leads to seek alliances with counterparts at an earlier stage. This imposes a greater burden on the Cabinet Office which plays a critical role in supporting the Prime Minister in pre-Council negotiations, in addition to encouraging departments to exploit the opportunities that direct networking by COES desk officers with their opposite numbers provides.¹⁴

The Blair government's reform strategy should therefore be seen as both a delayed and pre-emptory reaction to radically altered EU-level opportunity structures. The durability of the reforms is a testament to the relative stability of these structures. As one former head acknowledged, the demands of EU policy making today mean that reverting back to the traditional system that operated prior to 1997 would no longer be sustainable because it would be far too cumbersome and inefficient. Although the initial triggers for reform in 1997 and 2001 were attributable to agency, structural developments in Brussels help to explain the intermittent accretion of power at the centre because they limit the range of developmental trajectories open to national policy makers and reinforce path dependency, causing the reforms to be institutionalised over time to the point at which their reversal becomes impossible to conceive because of the perceived damage that this would do to the government's capacity to coordinate and project UK EU policy.

The other side of the coin is that structural change in the form of the usurpation of the General Affairs Council by the European Council, the emergence of powerful sectoral councils, and the growing importance of informal pre-Council discussions serve as a source of waning influence for the FCO. Moreover, the increasingly fragmented character of the EU policy agenda since 1997 has fundamentally challenged the traditional geographical-based structure and the separation of internal and external EU policy within the FCO, forcing it to centralise EU business into a single directorate structured around sectoral policy divisions. Pressure to expand permanent representations, reinforced by budgetary cutbacks across the FCO under

¹³ Including access to and the ability to lead summit discussions; the authority to launch policy initiatives; the autonomy to negotiate at a supranational level; the ability to network with, learn from, and construct strategic alliances with other heads of government; and the legitimacy to intervene in all aspects of domestic policy with an EU dimension.

¹⁴ Evidence that the development of this direct interface derives from European pressures for convergence can be found in UK proposals in 2001 for a secure electronic communication network to be established between all presidential/prime ministerial offices across the EU. Known as 'PrimeNet' the scheme was shelved because the French seemingly objected to the proposed use of British technology.

Labour (in part as an indirect consequence of the establishment of DfID), has had the effect of hollowing out the FCO Europe Directorate as resources and influence have shifted to the Cabinet Office and UKRep. Finally, institutional fusion stemming from the growth of direct departmental networking with European opposite numbers, driven in part by the FCO's own 1998 Step Change initiative (see below), has also had the perverse effect of undermining the dependency of policy leads on FCO desk officers as gatekeepers to Brussels and as a source of EU expertise.

By contrast the resource base of UKRep has expanded rapidly, not only to reflect the shift in government policy and to keep pace with the extension of EU competence, but also in response to the demands of competitive uploading so as to maintain its capacity to network with an enlarging union of member states. Not only this, the increasingly technical nature of EU dossiers, coupled with greater demands for flexibility during negotiations, has encouraged the government to delegate tactical decision making and grant further negotiating autonomy to Brussels-based attaches.¹⁵

Structures and Networking

The Blair government has instigated the reconfiguration of horizontal structures for coordinating EU policy. Traditionally the UK network was characterised by a hierarchical three-tier committee system (see figure 8), supplemented by a weekly Friday meeting to serve as a 'clearing house' to finalise policy positions and negotiating tactics.¹⁶ Over time however the system has come under increasing strain. Although the EQ(O) committee continued to meet several times a week in the mid-1990s (Burch and Holliday 1996: 89), the use of standing EQ-designated committees gradually declined.

Figure 8. Traditional cabinet committee structures for coordinating EU policy (Source: Bulmer and Burch 1998)



¹⁵ This is reflected in the fact that it has become the norm for departments to nominate permanent representatives rather than home-based officials to chair working groups during the UK Presidency.

¹⁶ The Friday meeting has always been chaired by the head of the European Secretariat and attended by the UK Permanent Representative, senior officials, and policy leads from across Whitehall.

Under Labour this longer-term trend away from rigid structures has been accelerated. At ministerial level the full cabinet and sub-committee (designated the EP committee) have met very rarely to discuss EU policy. In 1998 the Joint Ministerial Committee (Europe) was established to provide a mechanism for resolving disputes between central and devolved government. Despite initial scepticism, Jack Straw was pivotal in remodelling the committee from 2003 to become the preferred forum through which EU policy is now discussed and informally agreed on a monthly basis.¹⁷ As such the EP committee only exists to formally agree EU policy through written correspondence (see figure 9).

There have been two ill-fated attempts to enhance ministerial coordination. The Ministerial Group for European Coordination (MINECOR), established in 1999 and chaired by the Minister for Europe, was charged with achieving greater coordination for the presentation of EU policy and monitoring efforts to strengthen bilateral contacts with other member states.¹⁸ Like the position of its chair however, the group of junior ministers lacked the political seniority to talk beyond their narrow departmental brief, falling largely into abeyance after the departure of Keith Vaz in 2001 and finally disbanded in 2004. In June 2003 the EU Strategy committee was founded, jointly serviced by the European and Economic and Domestic Secretariats and chaired by the Prime Minister himself, to provide a forum for strategic thinking and high level coordination. Initially convened as a way for No.10 to engage the Treasury in a more transparent discussion about the assessment of the ‘five economic tests’, it met only three times – testament to a lack of constructive cooperation from the Chancellor and No.10’s unwillingness to push the issue further.

Figure 9. Ministerial level committee structures for coordinating EU policy since 1997



¹⁷ JMC(E) attracts ministerial representation from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, together with the leader of the Labour group in the European Parliament, therefore giving rise to a more open exchange of views than the EP committee.

¹⁸ MINECOR was composed of junior ministers from across Whitehall, ministerial representatives from the devolved administrations, and policy advisors from No.10, the FCO and the Treasury.

At official level the old EQ standing committees have been replaced with a flatter and more fluid system of ad hoc meetings. Rather than rely on formal designations, fixed memberships, and rigid schedules, meetings are convened at short notice by the COES on the basis of need, and participants invited according to their interest in a policy dossier. The complexity of EU policy has also led the COES to encourage departments to take responsibility for routine coordination by resolving problems through interdepartmental networking and by convening their own meetings. As such the Cabinet Office prefers departments to liaise with their devolved colleagues on an informal basis rather than convene the Joint Official Committee (Europe) – the official level equivalent of JMC(E). Until January 2005 official level coordination was achieved through two regular meetings – the European Strategy Group (ESG) and the weekly Friday meeting – both chaired by the head of the COES. Effectively superseding the EQ(S) committee, the ESG was convened from 2001 by Sir Stephen Wall, meeting quarterly to provide an informal forum conducive to ‘thinking outside the box’ and to develop a longer-term view of EU policy. By absorbing much of the work of the EQ(O) committee, the nature of the Friday meeting has changed, focused far less on week-by-week ‘firefighting’ and more on agreeing strategy for forthcoming summits and holding departments to account for the delivery of key dossiers.

In parallel to reforms aimed at increasing informal networking within the network, the Blair government sought to strengthen bilateral relationships with Europe, intensify direct strategic networking between EU counterparts, and improve EU public diplomacy at home through the 1998 Step Change initiative.¹⁹ The initiative gave the FCO and the Minister for Europe the blessing to monitor, encourage, cajole, and sometimes oblige departments to engage in a much more intensive way with their European opposite numbers and ask for regular updates on progress made, keeping track of departmental interaction with attaches by encouraging policy leads to copy communications to the relevant desk officer. Ministers and officials were encouraged to network directly with EU counterparts through the circulation of informal league tables and the use of monitoring grids which listed the number of bilateral trips departments had made or planned. Over time although the original league tables lost much of their early cache, they were revived in the run up to the 2005 UK EU Presidency to encourage policy makers to engage with members of the European Parliament.²⁰ The use of peer pressure in this way proved particularly effective amongst ambitious officials and junior ministers keen to demonstrate their pro-Europeanism.

A number of domestic factors underpin many of these changes. First, the ‘informalisation’ of network structures must be placed within the context of a longer-term trend towards less formal and more flexible mechanisms of decision making across the core executive (Burch and Holliday 1996: 45-6). Second, the shift from the EP committee to JMC(E) simply reflected the need to incorporate non-Whitehall players and provide access to privileged information, necessitating a new forum located outside the cabinet committee system and which is not formally subject to collective cabinet responsibility. At official level too devolution has contributed to greater informality as a way of circumventing the restricted membership of the EQ committees. Third, the proliferation of new information technology has transformed policy coordination, underpinning the shift from standing *committees* to standing *networks* – fixed contact lists of EU coordinators and policy leads. By enhancing

¹⁹ The initiative, in large part the idea of the deputy under secretary of state in the FCO at the time, Sir Colin Budd, advocated a more proactive policy of external projection through the identification of those strategic objectives on which the government had the desire to take a lead, and took the form of a series of initiatives trying to find common ground with other member states.

²⁰ Ministers stressed its importance for achieving policy objectives under the co-decision procedure and the need to proactively target key MEPs by improving the frequency and quality of briefing material, with a view to persuading them to support the government line. This encouraged many departments to designate MEP coordinators to formulate comprehensive lobbying strategies.

informal networking, the efficient distribution of government documents, and communication with multiple policy leads, problems are frequently resolved before they reach the Cabinet Office and meetings can be convened ‘virtually’ by email.

But adaptation can also be attributed in part to Europeanisation. The deepening and widening of integration over the 1990s has demanded greater responsiveness and flexibility by domestic policy makers, rendering cumbersome standing committees increasingly obsolete. Unlike domestic policy making in which the timetable for decision-making is relatively fixed and policy dossiers clearly delineated, EU policy making is highly unpredictable, fragmented along sectoral lines, and subject to complex issue linkages. For this reason informalisation has progressed further and faster with respect to EU policy than for domestic policy. Without this shift, one senior Cabinet Office official acknowledged that the UK system for coordinating EU policy would now be in serious trouble. Finally, Step Change represented a desire to maintain the momentum of Europeanisation well beyond the impetus of the 1998 presidency, but also an attempt to address the inevitable risk of differential empowerment that stemmed from the UK’s absence from the Eurozone.

Evaluating Network Change

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms introduced by the Blair government, the framework suggests that we consider four key intervening variables. It is how these variables effect network change that helps us to understand their likely impact upon network outcomes.

Informal Veto Points

The relative absence of formal veto points within the UK core executive needs to be balanced against the existence of powerful informal veto points, such as those stemming from small parliamentary majorities, inter- and intra-party divisions, or a sceptical press/public (Bulmer and Burch 2005), which help to explain the tendency for ministers to play down the administrative impact of integration, and why adaptation has been so incremental and intermittent. Under Major for example informal ministerial veto players prevented departments from addressing the relative disempowerment of the UK core executive over the 1990s. By contrast Blair’s parliamentary majority enabled him to command unassailable political authority in order to drive forward much-needed reform. Despite this, three informal veto points constrained Blair’s capacity to reconfigure the core executive and consequently the ability to project an unambiguously constructive EU policy.

The first relates to the government’s commitment to holding referenda on joining the European single currency and the European Constitutional Treaty. Although motivated by the desire to depoliticise both issues in the run-up to an election, the impact of pledging but failing to deliver a referendum had the perverse effect of sustaining media speculation. By framing ‘Europe’ in terms of a public vote, the decision effectively removed large swathes of EU policy from the largely settled parliamentary arena and exposed it to greater political pressures emanating from the media.

Second, despite strengthening the No.10-Cabinet Office axis, Blair’s control of the government’s strategic agenda did not extend to large swathes of EU policy over which Gordon Brown exercised a powerful informal veto. A deliberate strategy of secrecy and non-transparency enabled the Treasury to exploit valuable information as a form of leverage over other key players. By preventing officials from establishing a normal interdepartmental dialogue, the breakdown of trust and communication that this engendered produced a form of

systematic coordination failure.²¹ By undermining the autonomy of policy leads and inflating the level at which formal decisions could be made, officials were often forced to coordinate their activity outside of formal structures and away from ministerial supervision.

Two examples illustrate how this veto shaped government policy. The first relates to the five economic tests which constituted an effective institutional veto over any decision to join the single currency. As a *domaine reserve* for Brown, the Cabinet Office and FCO were relegated to simply shaping the tone and handling of the policy. The 2003 assessment effectively presented No.10 with a *fait accompli*, the final wording of which was only resolved after a face-to-face meeting between Blair and Brown. Far from enhancing strategic direction at official level, the strengthening of the Cabinet Office simply exacerbated historic and political tensions between the two departments.

A similar pattern emerged during the future financing negotiations. From mid-2003 it became clear that the Treasury not only sought to 'bat off' unwelcome interference from other departments, but also deliberately denied the Cabinet Office and No.10 access to detailed financial data so as to maintain a tight grip on the UK's negotiating position.²² Similarly at the Luxembourg Council in June 2005, Brown effectively prevented Blair from agreeing to a budget deal by withholding the necessary Treasury analysts and supportive evidence from No.10.²³ It was only from October that the Cabinet Office employed its most important resource – the personal authority of the Prime Minister – to regain control and, together with the FCO, deliberately marginalise the Treasury from the negotiating process in order to press for a deal.

The final veto point relates to the potential impact of devolution. Although reserving EU policy formulation to central government prevents the devolveds from wielding formal veto power, the salience of EU policy, the importance of projecting a unified position, and the controversy that would be generated if there were a public disagreement renders them informal veto players. A tacit acknowledgement of this potential power is reflected in the ministerial encouragement given to policy leads to engage with their devolved counterparts as a matter of routine, and the transformation of the inter-ministerial committee system to incorporate their input. Despite this, the potential for coordination failure remains. The asymmetrical nature of devolution renders the system potentially unstable over time as a direct consequence of differential empowerment between them. The logic of competitive uploading suggests that the devolved administrations and English regions may compete to upload their preferences into the Whitehall policy process and serve as a source of discontent with the status quo.²⁴ Moreover, the lack of a formal channel of participation at official level

²¹ One former senior official recalled a particular example: "I once wrote a letter to the Treasury, without in any way questioning their policy, just stating the arguments against that had been put [by other member states] and what should be done to counter them...and I got no answer. A few days later [a senior Treasury official] literally came up to me in the street and whispered 'that was a very good letter but of course we can't answer it'... It's a stupid position to get into because it meant that people like me had to make up the best arguments instead of having the Treasury's guidance".

²² A senior Treasury official remarked that they had "a personal remit to ensure that [the Cabinet Office] stayed at arms length...they were very keen to get hold of our model and our information. But our line at the Treasury was that if you don't understand how the modelling is done and on what basis these numbers are produced then you could misuse the information, so we need to provide both."

²³ A former official commented that the Treasury was "incapable of having a policy unless Gordon Brown had decided what it was...Blair was effectively relying on the advice of desk officers in the European Secretariat and the FCO to do the number crunching...That coordination failure was a direct product of Gordon Brown."

²⁴ A leaked report from the head of the Scottish Executive's Office in Brussels argued that inconsistent consultation by departments bred the perception that Scottish interests were being 'ignored, dismissed and forgot' (The Herald 2007). It advocated the emulation of the more assertive Welsh approach, even at the expense of clashing with the UK's position.

(because the JOC[E] has never met) contributes to the variability of engagement across Whitehall which is left to the discretion of policy leads. This anomaly requires resolution to ensure the durability of the system beyond the election of an openly 'Eurosceptic' government in Westminster.

Level of Centralisation

It is clear that the purpose of Blair's reforms has not been to centralise control over routine interdepartmental coordination, but rather to improve the provision of strategic direction and political leadership from the centre by reinforcing mechanisms for prime ministerial articulation and intervention. Despite this, the model of centralisation pursued risks exacerbating historical structural deficiencies which constrain the capacity of No.10 and the Cabinet Office from doing so effectively.

Historically the lack of legislative power and weak resource base of the COES renders it entirely dependent on the interest and cooperation of No.10. When this breaks down, as it did from 1992, it can struggle to impose discipline across the network. Although the reforms have strengthening its relative power, this has been achieved by reinforcing rather than challenging the relationship of dependency with No.10. Yet the capacity of No.10 to provide the necessary strategic leadership remains highly contingent, dependent on the Prime Minister's personal authority, the government's parliamentary majority, and the demands of other issues. Consequently the ability of Blair's European advisor to translate their authority into strategy ebbed and flowed over time, leaving the COES to focus on short-term political imperatives and vulnerable to buffeting by day-to-day events.²⁵ During the 2005 UK Presidency for example, the Cabinet Office was so geared towards monitoring the delivery of departmental objectives, it had little time to devote to longer-term contingency planning or 'blue-skies' thinking. According to one senior official this left UK officials under-prepared for the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in June 2005, and for Blair's decision to push for a successful conclusion to the future financing negotiations by December.

These problems were further exacerbated by Blair's informal, interpersonal style of decision-making which could be frustrating for officials looking for clear steers or definitive outcomes.²⁶ Blair was also criticised for failing to utilise or provide adequate encouragement to the development of strategic insights and engagement across the EU, particularly (in the case of Roger Liddle) from within his own team.²⁷ Again during the presidency, a lack of effective guidance and efficient decision-making from No.10 on organisational issues meant that the system became frustratingly slow, taking days to get a simple logistical decision approved. This delayed presidency planning, hampered delivery timetables, undermined sensible risk management, and led to announcements being made (such as the Hampton Court summit) at short notice with little consultation.

Finally, reform has left a legacy of an ambiguous balance of responsibilities between the Cabinet Office and the FCO which persists to this day. The enhancement of the strategic and policy advisory role of the COES, parallel with the internal restructuring of the FCO Europe Directorate around policy teams tasked with keeping a non-sectoral overview of policy

²⁵ Moreover, Kim Darroch's ability to 'crack the whip' across Whitehall was weakened as a consequence of Blair's public announcement that he would not serve as Prime Minister beyond a third term.

²⁶ Sir Stephen Wall recently criticised Blair's style for attempting to 'ride several horses at once' by avoiding summing up at the end of a cabinet meeting, leaving ministers and officials "thinking they have an agreed outcome when the outcome actually isn't all that clear" (Wall 2005).

²⁷ A former official argued that this was because "Blair wasn't very interested in Europe in an intellectual sense...in the way Thatcher or Major were, so there wasn't ever any encouragement to think strategically."

dossiers, has created a serious risk of duplication and overlap. In 2005 this blurred division of labour constituted a potentially serious flaw because at times departments were unclear where strategy should come from, who set the direction, and how it was to be communicated. The failure to clarify responsibilities at an early stage led to an inflated perception of the role of both departments and inevitable administrative overload.

In essence, by strengthening the COES without adequately reconfiguring its role or providing sufficient resources, the reforms reinforce the tendency for ministers and senior officials to look to No.10 for strategic guidance and risk raising expectations beyond that which can be reasonably met.

Level of Institutionalisation

The traditional interdepartmental committee system for coordinating EU policy displayed a high level of institutionalisation. Designed to permit the Cabinet Office a broad overview of all policy dossiers and to project a single, unified negotiating position (to be defended by the national veto where necessary), these structures reflected the continued contestation of European integration within the UK polity. By accelerating a longer-term shift to informalisation, Labour has sought to respond to Europeanisation pressures so as to underpin a more constructive EU policy. In doing so however the shift risks undermining parallel reforms within the core executive.

By delegating routine coordination downwards to departments, informalisation has for example made it more difficult for desk officers to monitor developments, to intervene, or to 'crack the whip' where necessary. As a result there is a tendency for departments to pursue idiosyncratic policies for longer. Moreover, rather than relieving the COES of the burden of routine coordination, the shift may impose new demands on time and resources which limit their capacity to foster longer-term strategic thinking as intended. Without fixed membership lists for meetings, desk officers must be careful to invite all interested players. Similarly it forces them to devote a greater effort to rigorous follow-up – through detailed action plans, timetables, and systems for monitoring – to ensure departments are delivering. Informal meetings must therefore be assiduously overlaid by a formal system of written EP correspondence to clear agreed lines and to minimise the risk of later coordination failure. But in recent years this dependency on EP correspondence has severely overloaded the FCO-managed system to the point at which decision making is hampered. As a result the need for negotiating lines to be revised at short notice cannot be effectively met.

At ministerial level the cabinet rarely discussed EU business, the EP committee was relegated to rubber stamping decisions, and because JMC(E) included the devolved administrations and was chaired by the Foreign Secretary, it suffered from poor ministerial turnout (Brown rarely attended) and lacked the authority to formulate broader strategy. Similarly at official level the decision not to re-convene the ESG since 2005 suggests that strategic thinking is likely to remain sidelined by tactical coordination within an increasingly over-burdened Friday meeting. By absorbing the functions of other committees and frequently lasting several hours in duration, it is perhaps little surprise that the Cabinet Office is finding it increasingly difficult to attract officials of senior rank to the meeting.

The increasing primacy of agency over structure that underpins informality carries its own dangers. First, as the use of standing committees declines so the effectiveness of coordination is increasingly dependent on facets of personality such as interpersonal skills. Although this provides benefits in the form of greater flexibility, it also leaves structures vulnerable to the status of individuals (as with MINECOR) and interpersonal rivalry (the EUS committee). Second, eroding horizontal structures undermines the incentive for officials to devote time and effort to exploring beyond their own policy field, thereby contributing to the 'silo'

mentality and short-termism that pervades highly decentralised systems. Regular committee meetings help to establish a reverse momentum that forces officials to engage with less immediate issues, such as long-term strategy. In this case it is the Cabinet Office that has to pick up the slack and/or constantly cajole policy leads to do so.

Finally, informalisation may amplify the asymmetrical distribution of power within the network in favour of those players whose influence primarily derives from wielding valuable resources (such as the Cabinet Office and UKRep) rather than their formal role (the FCO). Formal horizontal structures help to flatten hierarchies of power by structuring the behaviour of agents. Committees require players to articulate their policy preferences, account for their actions, air their grievances, and agree to binding conclusions under a neutral chair. In this way Jack Straw exploited his formal role as chair of the cabinet sub-committee to convene a wider forum for discussion that granted privileged access to minor players like the devolved administrations. In their absence those with the greatest strategic resources are able to ‘stitch up’ meetings before they are even convened. In several respects then, informality has triggered unintended consequences that are detrimental to the government’s wider reform strategy.

Institutional Memory

The capacity of the UK core executive to project a constructive EU policy through enhanced strategic networking as part of the Step Change initiative has been constrained by weak institutional memory. This derives from two primary sources: the high level of turnover amongst key players in EU-related positions; and the reconfiguration of administrative incentive structures.

With respect to turnover, it is rare to find anyone in an EU-related post for more than three or four years – or in the case of the COES and UKRep just two.²⁸ This fatally undermines the development of strong and durable networks and informal contacts, both within and between core executives, because relationships have to be constantly re-established. While turnover in theory serves to diffuse EU expertise across the network, excessive movement risks diluting the expertise that there is within the system. Because officials take much of their expertise and experience with them, turnover weakens the capacity for the accumulation of knowledge and undermines institutional memory within departments.

Second, the introduction of the Professional Skills for Government (PSG) agenda by Labour dictates that in order to gain promotion into and within the senior civil service officials must demonstrate skills in three streams (policy delivery, corporate services delivery, and operational delivery), none of which recognises EU knowledge or expertise as a valuable transferable skill in its own right. One manifestation of this is the serious decline in numbers applying for EU training and secondments generally, with the result that the European Faststream Programme is in danger of being cancelled altogether.²⁹ There is therefore a widely perceived perception that the PSG has had a detrimental impact on incentive structures for EU training and awareness raising across government, upon which effective strategic networking with EU counterparts is so dependent.

²⁸ A particularly characteristic feature of Whitehall is the periodic movement of staff immediately following a UK Presidency. In January 2006 there was a near total clearout of desk officers from the secretariat and permanent representation, while departments experienced an avalanche of departures amongst EU coordinators and policy leads.

²⁹ Established in 1992 to address the chronic under-representation of UK officials in the EU institutions, the programme at one time recruited 15/20 officials a year – in 2007 it was just 5.

Conclusion

The accepted view of administrative adaptation to EU membership in the UK suggests that it has been gradual and incremental, wholly in keeping with the prevailing developmental trajectory of the core executive (Bulmer and Burch 2005). Yet by focusing on formal institutions, structures and procedures, traditional institutionalist accounts perhaps downplay the extent and variability of adjustment necessitated by EU membership. They also fail to capture the significance of the reforms instigated by the Blair government which have profoundly reconfigured the nature of EU policy making in response to, and by building upon, pressures for change derived from Europeanisation.

The pattern of adaptation outlined above reveals that Europeanisation has unleashed two countervailing pressures for convergence within the UK core executive: centripetal and centrifugal. Centripetal pressures stem from competitive uploading and demand enhanced domestic coordination and strategic steering of national EU policy. As such they have given rise to the strengthened role and resources of the Cabinet Office/No.10; the emergence of UKRep as a fully integrated but independent player in its own right; and the institutionalisation of the Friday meeting. Yet these pressures for centralisation are counterbalanced by centrifugal forces which contribute to the growing size, fragmentation, and complexity of the network as a consequence of direct adaptational pressure from Brussels (the expansion of EU competence) and domestic constitutional reform. Paradoxically these undermine the ability of the centre to provide effective strategic steering just as the demand for it increases. The Blair government's strategy for managing this challenge has been to increasingly delegate responsibility for day-to-day interdepartmental coordination to lead departments, to grant greater autonomy and flexibility to UKRep for tactical decisions, and to abandon the traditional standing cabinet committee system in favour of increasingly informal ad hoc meetings. At the same time, the capacity of the centre to provide more effective strategic direction for EU policy has been enhanced by the closer integration of No.10 and the Cabinet Office. They have therefore sought greater control over less: in other words, the network has been 'hollowed out'.

In doing so however this paper finds that several aspects of the reform strategy have been hampered by unrelated domestic factors (such as the Treasury veto and constitutional reform), appear contradictory (by reinforcing dependency upon No.10), or have had unintended consequences (by overloading the Cabinet Office and correspondence system, and potentially weakening the incentives for further increasing strategic networking). Consequently in attempting to address many of the historic deficiencies characteristic of the UK's 'awkward state', adaptation of the UK EU network under Labour may in several respects have been unintentionally detrimental to the projection of an unambiguously constructive EU policy.

Bibliography

- Adshead, M. (2002) *Developing European Regions? Comparative Governance, Policy Networks and European Integration* Aldershot: Ashgate
- Borzel, T. (2002), 'Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanisation', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(2), pp193-214
- Borzel, T. (2005), 'Europeanisation: How the European Union Interacts with its Member States' in Bulmer, S. and Lequesne, C. (eds), *The Member States of the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 45-75
- Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (2000), 'The Europeanisation of British Central Government' in Rhodes, R. (ed), *Transforming British Government Vol.1 – Changing Institutions* London: Macmillan, pp.46-62
- Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (2005), 'The Europeanization of UK Government: From Quiet Revolution to Explicit Step-Change?', *Public Administration* 83(4): 861-890
- Burch, M. and Holliday, I. (1996), *The British Cabinet System* London: Prentice Hall
- Cabinet Office (2002), *Cabinet Office Annual Report*
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/reports/annualreport/co_report2002.pdf: 1-141
- Cabinet Office (2003), *Cabinet Office Annual Report*
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/reports/annualreport/co_report2003.pdf: 1-45
- Cabinet Office (2005), Cabinet Office European Secretariat presentation and notes, obtained June 2005.
- Cowles, M. G., Caporaso, J., and Risse, T. (eds) (2001) *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press
- Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2006) *Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK's International Priorities* London: Stationary Office
- Gains, F. (2004) 'Hardware, Software or Network Connection? Theorising Crisis in the Next Steps Agencies', *Public Administration* 82(3): 547-66
- Hay, C. (1998) 'The Tangled Webs we Weave: The Discourse, Strategy and Practice of Networking' in Marsh, D. (ed) *Comparing Policy Networks* Buckingham: Open University Press: 33-50
- Hay, C. and Richards, D. (2000) 'The Tangled Webs of Westminster and Whitehall: The Practice of Networking within the British Core Executive', *Public Administration* 78(1): 1-28
- Hennessy, P (2005) 'Rules and Servants of State: The Blair Style of Government 1997-2004' *Parliamentary Affairs* 58 (1): 6-16
- Herald, The. (2007) 'Left out in Europe Scots ministers can't afford to be ignored', 22 January 2007, Edinburgh

- Jacquot, S. and Woll, C. (2003) 'Usage of European Integration: Europeanization from a Sociological Perspective', *European Integration Online Papers* 7(12)
- Kallestrup, M. (2002) 'Europeanisation as a Discourse: Domestic Policy Legitimation through the Articulation of a 'Need for Adaptation'' in *Public Policy and Administration* 17(2): 110-124
- Knill, C. (2001) *The Europeanisation of National Administrations. Patterns of Institutional Persistence and Change* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Knoke, D. (1990) *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Liddle, R. (2005) 'Look Back at Power', interview with Roger Liddle, BBC Radio 4, September 2005
- Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W. (1992) 'Policy Communities and Issue Networks: Beyond Typology', in *Policy Networks in British Government* Oxford: Clarendon Press: 249-68
- Radaelli, C. (2003) 'The Europeanization of Public Policy' in Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C. *The Politics of Europeanisation: Theory and Analysis*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Tallberg, J. (2007) *Bargaining Power in the European Council*, Report 2007:1, Sweden: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies
- Wall, S. (2005) 'Look Back at Power', interview with Stephen Wall, BBC Radio 4, September 2005